University 2 studies are reported in this paper concerning social attitudes of Japanese and American college Ss toward various concepts related to nuclear and space science and technology. The first, Japanese-only study shows that, contrary to a common belief, the deep emotional "rejection reaction" to nuclear matters, known in Japan often as the "nuclear allergy", is not very salient for at least 2 out of 3 Japanese Ss, who believe that Japan will go nuclear within a limited length of time All the concepts related to nuclear experiments, however, are seen by the Japanese as highly undesirable.
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Gakuchuir University 2 studies are reported in this paper concerning social attitudes of Japanese and American college Ss toward various concepts related to nuclear and space science and technology. The first, Japanese-only study shows that, contrary to a common belief, the deep emotional "rejection reaction" to nuclear matters, known in Japan often as the "nuclear allergy", is not very salient for at least 2 out of 3 Japanese Ss, who believe that Japan will go nuclear within a limited length of time All the concepts related to nuclear experiments, however, are seen by the Japanese as highly undesirable.
The second, JapaneseAmerican cross-cultural study reveals that despite difference in cultures, the meaning of complex concepts related to nuclear and space science and technology may be lawfully predicted from the knowledge of the meaning of their components. Nonetheless, it is once again observed that all nuclear matters connote to the Japanese something highly undesirable whereas the Americans tend to discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable nuclear matters. The purpose of this cross-cultural study is two-fold: (1) to examine the attitudes of the Japanese and American youths toward proliferating nuclear and space science and technology as an extention of earlier studies (Tanaka, 1968 (Tanaka, , 1970 (Tanaka, , 1972 ; and (2) to explore the dynamic processes of cultural learning involved in the proliferation of the science and technology. The basic approach in the present study consists of a multidimensional model for attitude measurement.
AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Our
Many contemporary students of social attitudes have employed a distinction between the cognitive, affective and conntive components of attitudes, and more recent studies demonstrate that not only is it possible to measure these components independently but also each component is itself multidimensional (Katz & Stotland, 1959; Hovland & Rosenberg, 1960; Triandis, 1967; Tanaka, 1970 Tanaka, , 1972 . The semantic differential method (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957) provides the most effective, simplest way of obtaining the purest measure of the cognitive-affective components, while in the conative domain the behavioral component can be measured by the behavioral differential method developed by Triandis (1964) .
In the present study, the semantic differential and the behavioral differential methods constitute the major approaches to the systematic analysis of the attitudinal components associated with the proliferating nuclear and space science and technology. These two approaches will help to clarify the latent structure of cognitionaffect-behavior organization not only across each of the three attitudinal components, but also across communities differing in language and culture . JAPANESE ONLY, 1967 STUDY In the previous study on Japanese attitudes toward nuclear arms, Tanaka (1968 Tanaka ( , 1970 found that as many as 75% of some 400 college Ss "anticipate" in a 1965-66 period that Japan will go nuclear in the "foreseeable" future (within 20 years) whereas only 25% believe that will never occur. It was also found in the semantic differential experiments that the "evaluative" cultural meaning of nucleartesting-related concepts had shifted significantly in a "less undesirable" direction, in a 5-year period between 1961 and 1966. The Japanese-only, 1967 study was thus designed so as to extend the previous studies in more detail.
Method Subjects A total of 169 male and female college students majoring in humanities and the social sciences served as Ss in the experiment. They were assumed to be relatively homogenous with respect to age, education and socio-economic factors. Most Ss had been born in 1948 and 1949 and therefore are what may be called " postwar youth" having no experience with war.
Stimulus materials
First, "concepts" which are used as stimuli in both the semantic-differential (hereafter, SD) and behavioral differential (hereafter, BD) testings were constructed , using a facet design. Three facets were used in this experiment:(I) Techno-scientific cognitive events;(2) Conditions under which such events would occur; and (3) Spatial specification as to where they would occur . (Tanaka, 1970 (Tanaka, , 1972 Finally, we decided to use 7-point scales both for SD and for BD testings.
The Questionnaire A three-item questionnaire was prepared in which Ss were asked to give (1) the names of nuclear weapons,(2) the names of three nations that are most likely to go nuclear as a 6th, 7th, and 8th nuclear nation following Communist China, and (3) the years (i.e., within 5, 10, 15, or 20 years from now, or never) in which Japan would be most likely to go nuclear. With regard to the last two questions, Ss were also asked to give appropriate reasons for their prediction. The SI) and BD test forms and the questionnaire were given in the Japanese language. All the testings were executed in groups.
Results
The predicted liming of Japan's going nuclear
In the questionnaire, Ss were asked how soon, in their opinion, Japan would go nuclear, although this question was completely "hypothetical" as there is no indication whatsoever that Japan will in fact move in this direction. In Table 1 , it is shown that one in every two 1967 Ss believes that Japan will go nuclear in a foreseeable future (i.e., within 10 years and within 20 years), whereas one in every three Ss thinks that Japan will never go nuclear. Compared with the 1965-68 and with the 1969 distributions of opinions, which are also shown in the table, no significant difference was found between the 1967 and the 1969 data (x2= 4.5667, df= 2; p<. 20, N. A. omitted), but there was a real difference between the 1967 data and the 1965-68 total (x2= 7.2091, df= 2; p<. 05, N. A. omitted). The relative proportion of Ss who hold Japan will never go nuclear appears larger in 1967. 
SD-BD-scale intercorrelations and factor analysis
Scale factor analysis in the present work was carried out in order to determine the structure of the affective-cognitive-conative dimensions of attitudes and in order to see whether the same attitudinal criteria are used across subject groups differing in beliefs. Principal-component solutions and Varimax rotations were used throughout. In order to test the over-all generality of the affective-cognitive-conative system across Ss, Ss were divided into three groups differing in their anticipatory beliefs-whether Japan would go nuclear (Group II), and never (Group III), each group equally consisting of 30 Ss. Separate factor analysis was carried out for each of the three groups independently. There are some highly intriguing results of factorization.
It is evident in Table 2 that the coefficients of these factors derived in independent factorizations overlap in magnitude to such an extent that each of the three groups contributes to each of the factors with striking similarity.
Dimensions, in other words, cut across all three groups and are almost equally defined by all three; no separate factors for Group I, for Group II, or Group III are found, as might have been expected if there had been great intracultural variation. Japanese. With respect to the Desirability factor dimension, common to all the three groups are not only general evaluative SD scales like beautiful-ugly and bright-dark but also the BD scales like should not be limitedshould be limited and would better be encouraged -would not better be encouraged. This particular configuration appears to indicate that, for the Japanese Ss, an event related to nuclear-space science and technology is very desirable (i.e., viewed as pleasant) and hence highly appreciated (i.e., considered as it should not be banned, but can be and would better be encouraged) if it is seen simultaneously as democratic (consistent to the most dominant political value of our age), bright (in whatever it contributes to the future of Man), and beautiful (with respect to its esthetic connection). The Ban-Feasibility factor also shows an interesting configuration. It appears as if the Japanese Ss use a very pragmatic "psychologic". This "psycho-logic" seems to suggest that "whatever can be banned or limited, should not and will not be encouraged." This "psycho-logic" seems reasonable insofar as any effort would be a waste and Composite scores and the quadrant analvsis A composite score is defined as the nonweighted average of several scale means along the same factor dimension and serves to simplify interpretation of data. In order to index the affective-conative meanings of concepts, a total of two composit scores, each representing one of the two salient factors, Desirability and Ban-Feasibility, were computed for each concept in the three subject groups. The indices were computed from stable scales that had the highest factor loadings on a given factor for all the three subject groups. Specifically, four scales (two SD and two BD) were used for Desirability and two for Ban-Feasibility.
Intracultural consistency in perceiving the proliferation of nuclear-space science and technology. Ss in the three subject groups all belong to the same culture but their perceptions differ: those in Groups I and II hold that Japan will go nuclear within a limited length of time, whereas those in Group III believe that Japan will never go nuclear. Hence the question: do Ss in Groups I and II perceive nuclear-space science and technology in the same way as those in Group III ? If they do, we shall have evidence of intracultural consistency concerning the way in which young, educated Japanese see the proliferation of science and technology.
Three separate analyses were made, all on the basis of the composite scores. First, we correlated the composite scores among the three subject groups over 35 concepts, separately for each of the two factor dimensions.
If they are all near unity, one group sees the 35 events exactly as the other see them.
If they are near zero, there is no consistent way of seeing the 35 events by the three groups. On the other hand, agreement is somewhat lower along the Ban-Feasibility dimension.
Second, our interest also lay in examining the uniqueness of the concepts used in this study.
Many concepts are assumed to be"obnoxious" to the Japanese in the sense that they are related to formidable nuclear and missile testings that might he associated even with arms development. To the extent that the meanings of a concept are characterized by two composite scores, one for Desirability and another for Ban-Feasibility, we can investigate the 88 for Group III). In other words, the Japanese generally tend to perceive as more feasible to ban those nuclear-space things that are viewed as more undesirable. To the extent that the 35 concept sample is roughly representative of the total concept population related to nuclear-space science and technology in terms of the kinds of events, conditions, and locations, such significant correspondence among"traits" may be taken to be both general among the Japanese and unique to perception of nuclearspace things.
Third, to the extent that the"image" of an event is in the present case characterized by two composite scores, representing Desirability and Ban-Feasibilityfactors, it is possible to examine the correspondence of the location of each concept in the two-dimensional space, that might hold across the three subject groups.
To simplify the comparisons, a t is computed between the corresponding composite scores over the 35 concepts, along each dimension for each subject-group pair. A statistically significant t then will indicate that the mathematical means over the 35 composite scores are significantly different between the two groups compared along one factor dimension. If we obtain a nonsignificant t simultaneously for each of the two factor dimensions, then we will conclude that the two groups compared do share in the two-dimensional space the same meanings of the 35 concepts.
From t-test results we found that in the Desirability factor dimension Groups I and II, and they alone, do share the meaning of the concepts, whereas in connection with Ban-Feasibility, every group is different from every other group. In other words, if we take into account the direction of differences, it is shown that what Groups I and II equally view as desirable is viewed by Group III as less desirable, while no such consistent variation exists in their judgment of the banfeasibility. The foregoing findings are of considerable interest, because it is now clear that those who hold "Japan will go nuclear within a limited length of time (i.e., within 10 years and within 20 years)" also hold significantly higher valuation concerning the concepts related to nuclearspace science and technology than do those who hold that "Japan will never go nuclear".
We thus have evidence that the attitudes toward nuclear and space things are quite consistent in the Japanese and therefore highly predictable: If a Japanese accepts as well as perceives nuclear and space things as desirable, it is more likely that he will also hold Japan will go nuclear, capable of a "changing status quo" thinking, whereas if he is inclined to refuse nuclear and space things, it is more likely that he maintain Japan will never go nuclear, clinging to a "status quo" thinking. In either case, the anticipatory belief might he fairly faithful projection of a wishful thinking about the future state of affairs that would be perceived as both possible and desirable. We will return to this question in a subsequent section.
The quadrant analysis. In order to summarize the meanings of concepts, the 35 concepts can be allocated in a four-dimensional semantic space, each dimension being defined by a semantic factor. To make our understanding easier at this point, let us consider a two-dimensional rather than a four-dimensional semantic space, defined by the Desirability and Ban-Feasibility factors.
The two-dimensional space can he divided into four regions, or quadrants, each of which is defined by the end point of the two dimensions taken in all possible combinations. A concept would thus he assigned to Quadrant I if that concept has composite scores toward the positive end of the Desirability factor (D+-beautiful; should not be banned) and Ban-Feasibility (B+-can be banned). The quadrant allocation of a concept in a two-dimensional meaning space is thus a shorthand statement of its connotative meanings. Table 3 displays the 30"compound" concepts assigned to each quadrant. These allocations reflect the basic "nuance" each concept has for the Japanese. Generally, there seems to he reasonably high stability of the nuances of each concept across the three groups. Nearly all the concepts related to [PC/] (peace) are assigned to either Quadrant I (D+B+) or IV (D+B-), both positive in direction concerning Desirability, differing only in directions along the Ban-Feasibility dimension. On the other hand, most concepts associated with [WP/] (arms development) are allocated in Quadrant II (D-B+). It is noted that nearly 60% of the total concepts fall in this quadrant in each group. This might indicate that Quadrant II represents the major"nuances" of the compound concepts used in the present study-a powerful implication that undesirable nuclear-space things are liable to strict, po-litical and social restrictions. On the other hand, we also note that there are only a few concepts assigned to Quadrant IV (D+B-). It appears reasonable to assume that, for the Japanese, only a limited number of truly good nuclear-space things, such as [PC/DG/CP], and they alone, are viewed as being free from such restrictions. Finally, no concept whatsoever is assigned to Quadrant III (D-B-) .
The foreging quadrant assignments of the 30 compound concepts appear to show clearly that the nuances of the compound concepts tend to vary as the statement of [NE] and [ME] are highly negatively valued when they are associated with a "qualit ing" adjectival phra se having Figs 1, 2, and 3 are graphic representations of the two-dimensional semantic spaces for the three subject groups judging the same class of "event" concepts. In each figure, three typical compound concepts, varied in the "condition" components, are allocated for the three groups. By inspection, the location of one concept in the semantic space in relation to all the others can be examined within each group, across the three groups, and further across the three classes of the "event" concepts. Generally, it can be seen in the figures that the three subject groups (each being specified by a different closed figures) judging the same concepts (indicated by the same number) tend to cling together in most cases, although the ratings of Desirability by Group III are nearly always somewhat lower than those by the others as might be expected.
This may be taken as another indication of intracultural stability of meanings.
It also seems clear in the figures that the meanings of the compound concepts are highly susceptible to the influence of the meanings of "qualifying" adjectival phrases concerning an alphabetic letter These findings appear to show that differences among the groups in the cognitive mapping of the nuclear-space world are relatively small but real, and that, despite the real differences, there is a consistent way of semantic interaction common to all the three subject groups. We have already seen that a powerful within-culture con- Table 4 . The four factors in Table 4 can readily be identified as Desirability, DynamismFamiliarity, Pure Familiarity, and Potency factors. In both the Japanese and American groups, Factor I is characterized by the SD scales, beautiful-ugly, bright-dark, and by the BD scales, should be encouraged-should not be encouraged, should not be banned-should be banned; Factor II, by slow fast and weakstrong; Factor III, by far-near and unfamiliar-familiar only for the Japanese Factor IV, by fragile-sturdy and will not be encouraged-will be encouraged, again only for the Japanese. We note that nearly all the BD scales load highly on Factor I, and on this factor alone, in both language/culture groups.
It is evident in Table 4 that coefficients of the first two pancultural factors overlap in magnitude to such as extent that each language/culture group contributes to each of the factors with great similarity. Note that the first pancultural factor is composed of both Japanese and American scales having identical connotative meanings and nearly identical factor loadings, despite different origins. Dimensions, in other words, cut across both language/culture groups and are almost equally defined by both. On the other hand, we also have evidence of the culturally unique use of scales for Factors III and IV, on which only Japanese scales load significantly high. Furthermore, for the Americans, both Familiarity and Dynamism coalesce into one single factor. Finally, in comparison with the previous 1967 study, what was previously found to be two separate factors, namely, Desirability and Ban-Feasibility, emerge as one in this cross-cultural study.
In summary, cross-cultural factorization of the Japanese and American SD-BD data indicates that a reasonably high degree of cross-cultural generality operates in the semantic spaces of the Japanese and Americans. It is shown, however, that some cultural uniqueness is also present in the semantic spaces; for the Japanese, Familiarity and Potency are separate factors, independent from every other factor, whereas for the Americans they tend to converge. Finally, nearly all the BD scales are found to load significantly highly on the Desirability factor. This can be taken as an indication that both the Japanese and Americans in this study did not discriminate among the connotative meanings of the auxiliary verbs at all. Directions of both SD and BD scales seem quite consistent and logically reasonable, but there is no separate BD factor whatsoever, as previously found in the 1967 study, both in the Japanese and in the American groups in which all BD scales load equally high on the same factor.
Cross-cultural analysis of the perception of the nuclear-space science and technology
The Japanese and Americans not only belong to different language/culture communities but they differ in their perception of the world: in the foregoing analysis, the Japanese and Americans prove to be different in their perception of whether Japan will go nuclear at all, and if so, how soon Japan will go nuclear. It must be recalled that a significantly larger proportion of American Ss believe "Japan will go nuclear within 10 years" in comparison with Japanese Ss who are more sharply divided in their beliefs. So there is sound ground to ask if the Japanese perceive the nuclear-space science and technology in the same manner as do the Americans. The purpose of the following analyses is to examine the way in which the Japanese and Americans perceive the concepts related to the proliferating nuclear-space science and technology and to is consistent across the two culturally different groups.
In order to answer these questions, two composite scores, each representing one of the two salient factors of Desirability and Dynamism, were computed for each concept in each group.
Four scales (two SD and two BD) previously used in the 1967 study were once again used for Desirability and two SD scales for Dyanmism. On the basis of these composite scores, two separate analyses were made in the same way as the previous 1967 study.
First, our interest lies in finding whether the cultural meanings of the concepts are similar or different across the two subject groups.
Do the Japanese view as desirable and dynamic what is seen by Americans as desirable and dynamic? To get at this question, we correlated the corresponding composite scores between the Japanese and American groups over the concepts separately for each factor dimension.
A correlation coefficient of .91 and .67 was obtained for Desirability and for Dynamism, respectively.
The correlation is extremely high for Desirability, accounting for more than 80% of the variance, while it is somewhat lower for Dynamism. In other words, the cultural meanings of the concepts are found to be reasonably stable across the Japanese and the American groups both in Desirability and Dynamism. In this connection, it is particularly noteworthy that in the judging of a variety of events related to nuclear-space science and technology, the eualuatiue criteria both for the Japanese and for the Americans thus prove to overlap in significant magnitude, despite all the other differences in their cultural, linguistic, and political backgrounds.
To test the intracultural, diachronic stability of the cultural meanings of the concepts, the corresponding Desirability composite scores were correlated between the 1967 and the 1969 Japanese over the concepts. It will be recalled that the factor structures are somewhat different between 1967 and 1969, so that only the Desirability factor dimension is compatible for a stringent statistical test. In this test, we obtained an extremely high r (.99) and an insignificant t (.8584), which sufficiently enables us to conclude that a very high degree of consistency exists through time in the eualuatiue, cultural meanings of the concepts for the Japanese. Various domestic as well as international events related to the nuclear-space problem, such as the SALT negotiations or the powerful citizen's movement against the construction of nuclear-power stations in Japan, do not seem to have influenced the Japanese attitudes toward the concepts related to nuclear-space science and technology.
Second, the relative '' distance "between the Japanese and American cultural meanings for the corresponding concepts was examined by t-tests.
The t-test results showed that the cultural meahings do significantly (p<.01) differ between the Japanese and the American groups in the Desirability factor dimension, and in this dimension alone; no significant difference was found in Dynamism. By inspection, it is clear that the Japanese tend to rate undesirable concepts as more undesirable than do the Americans. In other words, although both basically agree in the direc-tions of evaluation as to whether an object of judgment is desirable or undesirable,they differ in the"intensities"of evaluative meaning.For example,the mean Desirability score computed over all the concepts was as large as-.86 scale unit for the Japanese whereas it was only-.04 for the Americans.
The quadrant analysis The quadrant analysis in this cross-cultural study was carried out on the basis of the two-dimensional spaces for both the Japanese and Americans,each equally defirined by the Desirability (Ds) and Dynamism(Dy)factors.In the present analysis, both"component"and"compound" concepts are assigned to the cultural" quadrants of each group and the"cultural"nuances of the concepts then compared across the two groups. TESTINGS IN ALL  THE NATIONS  INTENDED  FOR  ARMS DEVELOPMENT,for example. Quadrants III and IV are uniquely Japanese,since no concept belonging to the American group is assigned to them.It seems as if the Japanese were influenced by the component[/DG/]which"pulled" the meaning of the compound concepts toward the negative pole of Dynamismtoward slatir and weak.On the other hand,the concept organization for the Americans seems more simplex to the extent that there is only a dichotomous, affective-cognitive world for them-a world in which events are viewed either as desirable and strong or as undesirable and strong,no other combination present in their perception.2
In spite of these differences,however, the previous statement that the nuances of the compound concepts tend to vary as the statement of"conditions"is varied, holds true once again,now across the two language/culture groups.We must emphasize that the dynamics of cognitive interaction is complex.Even so,the foregoing analyses and their results would seem to indicate that the meaning of a complex compound concept might be lawfully predicted from the knowledge of the meaning of its components.The"meaning we deal with in perceiving the proliferating nuclear-space science and technology is universally subject to lawful variations.
The foregoing argument may further be illustrated by Fig.4 .In Fig.4 ,for both the Japanese and Americans,total of seven concepts related to[/NE]but varied in condition"and"location are assigned to each of the four"quadrants"in two-dimensional semantic space. In addition,a PEACE-related concept, [PC/AL/CP],is also displayed in the classes of concepts in the same semantic space across the two language/culture groups. the factor analytic results described above in that the Americans were found to use fewer affective dimensions than the Japanese.Exactly the same tendency was noted in earlier cross-cultural studies by the present writer (Tanaka & Osgood,1965; Tanaka,Oyama,& Osgood,1963; Tanaka,1972 by itself is viewed as highly undesirable in both subject groups is made more desirable when associated with[PC/],but equally undesirable for the Japanese and more undesirable for the Americans when combined with[WP/].The pattern is quite consistent across the two groups.However,in most cases,the concepts related to"location"seem to exert only a little indluence on such semantic interaction.
Third,we note,on the other hand,a near-perfect agreement in the meaning of [PC/AL/CP]which is viewed as quite desirable and slightly strong across both groups,In other words,the concept has the universal meaning for both,insusceptible to interaction with both culture and language.Hence,it may be assumed that the differences we find in the meanings of all the other concepts between the Japanese and Americans are not mere statistical artifacts but are real,reflecting true differences in sensitivity,knowledge, and learning experience unique to each culture.
In the last analysis,some Japanese absolutely reject all the[/NE]-related concepts,regardless of"purpose"and "location" .This deep emotional"rejection reaction"unique to the Japanese, however,has long been known to exist among the Japanese (Tanaka,1970) . Historically,more than twice in the relatively short period of the nuclear age, Japan has suffered from the lethal hazards of nuclear explosions.apan is the country against whose population the first and second atom bombs were actually dropped in 1945.Furthermore,when the crew of a small Japanese fishing vessel operating in the Pacific was caught in radioactive fallout resulted from an American nuclear test explosion in 1945,one of the crew of this vessel died from contamination.The Japanese feel angry because they,and they alone,were the victims of the lethal nuclear disasters.They are hypersensitive to the potential danger of the use of nuclear energy.These emotional overtones are
